Towards an organizational theory of hubris: symptoms, behaviours and social fields within finance and banking by Tourish, Dennis
 1 
 TITLE: 
Towards an organizational theory of hubris: 
Symptoms, behaviours and social fields within finance and banking 
ABSTRACT 
 
Hubris has become a popular explanation for all kinds of business failure. It is often reduced 
to the one-dimensional notion of ‘over-confidence,’ particularly on the part of CEOs. There is 
a need to clarify the extent to which other attitudes and behaviours constitute hubris, and how 
they are affected by such organizational dynamics as the struggle for power, status and material 
rewards between actors. This paper explores these issues within the finance and banking 
sectors. It uses the Critical Incident Technique to identify behaviours associated with hubris, 
and probes the interaction between them and the organizational contexts in which they occur. 
Five categories of behaviour based on an analysis of 101 incidents are described, as are a series 
of ‘inflection dynamics’ that reinforce the behaviours in question and constitute a social field 
conducive to hubris. I challenge the reductionist views that hubris is primarily a psychological 
state consisting mainly of ‘over-confidence.’ This paper seeks to complexify the term hubris, 
and to develop an organizational rather than purely psychology theory of its emergence and 
institutionalisation within finance and banking.  
 






The world economy suffered long term damage from the effects of the Great Recession 
that took place in 2008. An analysis of its effects in twenty-three countries concluded that ‘The 
losses in potential output range from almost nothing in Australia and Switzerland to more than 
30% in Greece, Hungary, and Ireland; the average loss, weighted by economy size, is 8.4%’ 
(Ball, 2014: 1). However, as Starkey (2015: 652) has noted, ‘management and management 
research seem strangely lacking in the voluminous literature on the crisis.’ Yet management 
within the finance and banking sectors was clearly implicated in what Kerr and Robinson 
(2011) characterise as the ‘auto-destructive behaviours’ that led previously successful 
organizations to ruin, inflicting widespread societal damage as they did so. Failure to address 
such behaviours harms our ability to guard against similar crises in the future.  
This paper focuses on hubris, generally defined in terms of excessive self-confidence, over-
optimism, exaggerated self-esteem, pride and arrogance (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; 
Hayward, 2007; Sadler-Smith et al, 2017). It has become a popular explanation for 
organizational failures in general. Indeed, Bollaert and Petit (2010: 362) argue that in 
‘corporate finance and strategic management, the idea of executive hubris has come to 
dominate the perceptions of the psychology of top managers.’ Despite this, we lack a 
systematic understanding of how hubris emerges, how management systems and 
organizational contexts underpin it, and how we might act to limit its worst effects.  
I begin by defining hubris, and highlight the limitations of many attempts to discuss it. In 
particular, I argue that the term is often used as a simplistic synonym for over-confidence, 
thereby neglecting its other dimensions. Hubris may already have become a cultural meme 
whose overuse short circuits our ability to understand the boundary conditions within which it 
operates. To address this, the paper explores the organizational dynamics that encourage 
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hubris. I argue that hubris is the result of repeated interactions between actors within particular 
organizational contexts that facilitate its emergence. My contribution develops the view that 
hubris is much more of an organizational than a psychological phenomenon, and certainly 
more so than conventional accounts are inclined to acknowledge. 
I draw on interviews with 27 people from a wide variety of levels within the banking and 
finance sectors in the UK to identify behaviours associated with commonly accepted diagnostic 
criteria for hubris. These are used to develop a typology of behaviours that indicate emergent 
hubris, and the management practices and inflection dynamics that facilitate them. Building on 
this understanding, steps are suggested that can ease these problems in the future. 
The research objective therefore is: 
To identify the behaviours, organizational dynamics and contextual influences that actors 
deem consistent with hubris within the finance and banking sectors 
The exploratory research questions that flow from this are: 
1. How, if at all, do these behaviours interact to determine hubris? 
2. What contextual and organizational factors are associated with its emergence? 
3. What are the relational dynamics among actors that help to produce hubris? 
4. What, if anything, distinguishes confidence from over-confidence, and reckless 
decisions from those that have simply led to unfavourable outcomes? 
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT AND ATTRIBUTION 
Our notions of hubris have their origins in Ovid’s story of how Icarus and his father 
Daedalus acquired the power of flight. Icarus’s infatuation with flying led him ever higher. 
Eventually, ‘The scorching rays of the sun grew closer and softened the fragrant wax which 
fastened his plumage. The wax dissolved; and… Icarus flapped his naked arms deprived of the 
wings which had caught the air that was buoying them upwards’ (Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book 
 4 
8, lines 221-230). Here, hubris is but the prelude to nemesis, depicted as the inevitable 
consequence of humans straying beyond the limits of their natural condition. The association 
of hubris with nemesis endures to this day (Ronfeldt, 1994). Additionally, in his Rhetoric, 
Aristotle drew attention to how hubris involves doing and saying things that inflict harm, 
gratuitous insults to demonstrate one’s superiority over others and greed that leads to the 
perpetuation of injustice. Drawing on this tradition, Button (2011: 312) suggests that hubris is:  
‘a branch of moral cruelty. Hubris entails the assertion of superiority through the exuberant, 
unabashed, and contemptuous violation of another person’s equal moral standing, often 
through… forms of ill-treatment designed to denigrate or diminish others. Hubris is marked 
by a settled disposition to reduce, shame, or humiliate others as a means of asserting, 
consolidating, or relishing in one’s own relative pre-eminence.’  
The Ancient Greeks were alert to its damaging effects. Demosthenes was quoted in the 4th 
Century BC as follows: ‘There is nothing, nothing at all men of Athens, more intolerable than 
hubris, or more deserving of your anger.’ In contrast to the classical tradition of thought on 
hubris (see Cairns, 1996, for overview), the concept has become more narrowly defined in 
recent years. Some researchers tend to discuss hubris exclusively in terms of over-confidence 
(e.g. Tang, Li,  and Yang, 2015). This often reduces it to little more than an indiscriminate 
term of abuse for failure. An emphasis on individual pathology may also be taken to imply that 
systemic organizational changes are unnecessary. Rather, the vilification of a few ‘bad apples’ 
may suffice. It is part of the purpose of this paper to promote a more organizational 
understanding of this complex phenomenon. 
Viewed purely in psychological terms, hubris has been depicted as having much in 
common with narcissism, the latter defined as encompassing those ‘who have very inflated 
self-views and who are preoccupied with having those self-views continuously reinforced’ 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007: 351). Kets de Vries (1990: 755) has described hubris as ‘a 
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predictable offshoot of unbridled narcissism.’ It leads individuals to prioritize their own needs 
over those of the organizations that they lead (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006). This suggests 
that narcissism may be a disposition that assumes otherwise latent hubristic forms under certain 
conditions. 
Owen and Davidson (2009) list fourteen key characteristics of hubris, and how they 
correspond to features of Cluster B personality disorders in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic Statistical Manual [DSM]-V). They argue that five of these are 
unique to hubris, and help to distinguish it from such notions as narcissism. These are:  
1. A tendency to view their interests as identical to those of the nation or organization; 
2. Tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal ‘we’; 
3. An unshakeable belief that they will ultimately be vindicated by for example history or 
God; 
4. Restlessness, recklessness, and impulsiveness; 
5. Tendency to allow their vision and belief about the appropriateness of a course of action 
to obviate the need to consider its practicality, cost or outcome. 
Other characteristics include excessive confidence in one’s own judgement, a messianic 
manner of talking, and a disproportionate concern with image and presentation. However, 
many of these are difficult to operationalise or to observe unambiguously (Craig and Amernic, 
2014). It is far from clear how observers can determine when confidence shades into 
‘excessive’ confidence, when a concern for image and presentation becomes 
‘disproportionate,’ or precisely what constitutes ‘recklessness.’ This puts a question mark over 
the extent to which it can be viewed purely as a psychological state, since the vagueness of the 
DSM criteria lends itself to indiscriminate attribution and diagnosis.  
Additionally, while hubris is often seen in terms of an increased propensity to take risks, 
‘opportunity’ and ‘risk’ within organizations tend to be coterminous (Power, 2014). 
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Uncertainty signals the possibility of both success and failure (Drummond, 2014). While it 
may be easy to decide in retrospect that too many risks were taken, it is not clear how such a 
determination can be made a priori rather than post-hoc (Rosenzweig, 2007). Often, if an 
action or decision succeeds it is characterised as justified confidence. However, if the same 
action fails, it is viewed as hubris (Reina, Zhang, and Peterson, 2014). At a minimum, the 
notion of hubris requires ‘further refinement’ (Russell, 2011: 144). 
The negative effects of hubris 
Despite conceptual and measurement problems, researchers have argued that hubris has 
multiple negative effects (e.g. Haynes, 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2015). These include leading 
decision makers to exaggerate the advisability of acquisitions (Roll, 1986), inaccurately 
believe that they have complete knowledge of their operating environment (Stein, 2003), to 
over-pay for potential assets (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), to over-estimate their own talents 
and abilities (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982), and in consequence to favour seemingly 
simple formulas for success that actually damage performance (Picone, Dagnino, and Mina, 
2014). Much of this literature focuses on CEOs (e.g. Bianchi and Mohliver, 2016; Petit and 
Bollaert, 2012), on the assumption that their position of power makes them more inclined to 
develop hubris than the general population (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). Researchers have 
argued that hubristic CEOs ‘develop an overambitious vision’ (Kroll, Toombs, and Wright, 
2000: 454), pay insufficient attention to strategy formulation and sustainability (Grant and 
Viscinti, 206), cause greater losses for shareholders from hubris driven acquisitions 
(McManus, 2016), prefer their own intuitive judgements over relevant information (Claxton, 
Owen, and Sadler-Smith, 2015) and are more likely to engage in financial misreporting 
(Cormier, Lapointe-Antunes, and Magnan, 2016). In short, hubristic individuals are depicted 
as paragons of vice. 
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Emphasizing hubris at the level of CEOs is also consistent with the tendency to view it as 
‘a disorder of the possession of power, particularly power which has been associated with 
overwhelming success, held for a period of years and with minimal constraint on the leader’ 
(Owen and Davidson, 2009: 1397). But studying it only at this level limits our ability to identify 
early onset behaviours and the deeply embedded organizational dynamics that facilitate its 
gradual emergence in individuals and their rise to leadership positions.  
The positive effects of hubris? 
Moreover, some behaviours associated with hubris may be beneficial. Paulhus and 
Williams (2002: 561) have stressed that, ‘no personality trait is universally adaptive or 
maladaptive.’ In relation to hubris, Owen and Davidson (2009: 1396) acknowledge that 
‘Charisma, charm, the ability to inspire, persuasiveness, breadth of vision, willingness to take 
risks, grandiose aspirations and bold self-confidence… are often associated with successful 
leadership.’ Over-confident people are more likely to become CEOs than their more measured 
counterparts (Goel and Thakor, 2008), while ‘positive illusions’ help people cope with 
adversity, develop resilience in the face of setbacks and show more creativity (Taylor and 
Brown, 1988). This is distinct from mindless optimism, or the view that a positive attitude can 
invariably compensate for objectively difficult circumstances. As Hayward, Forster, 
Sarasvathy, and Fredrickson (2010: 576) concluded:  
‘Hubris theory may rush to the erroneous conclusion that overconfidence necessarily hurts 
actors, their organizations and societies… In practice, there may be many situations where 
heedful and risk conscious actors should be highly confident, and at risk of overconfidence, 
because the longer term benefits of such confidence overwhelm any concern for an error 
of judgement.’   
Such confidence, like other strengths, may only be harmful when it is over-exercised – that 
is, when it is applied indiscriminately to multiple situations (Kaiser, LeBreton and Hogan, 
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2015). In summary, this review suggests that hubris is a multi-faceted construct that has much 
in common with narcissism. In line with this, Sadler-Smith et al (2017) describe hubris as an 
acquired disorder, and stress its situation specific (i.e. organizational) antecedents. Moreover, 
some environments – such as finance and banking – may provide a more hospitable climate 
for its emergence than others. 
Hubris and the 2008 banking crisis 
To what extent was the banking crisis of 2008 at least partly caused by hubris? This 
question has been explored directly and indirectly in some accounts of what occurred (e.g. 
Hargie, Stapleton and Tourish,  2010; Lawrence, Pazzaglia, and Sonpar,  2011; Tourish and 
Hargie, 2012; Martin, 2013; Knights and McCabe, 2015). Galbraith (2014) discusses what he 
terms ‘the great delusion,’ namely that technical innovations had so removed risk from the 
system that continued expansion was assured. This belief promoted a culture of entitlement, 
intense self-belief, risk, infectious greed and excess (Palermo, Power, and Ashby, 2017). The 
notion of a ‘great delusion’ echoes the words of Alan Greenspan, the then-Federal Reserve 
Board chairman in the US, who spoke of ‘irrational exuberance’ during the dot-com bubble of 
the 1990s1. Jean-Baptiste Karr’s famous aphorism is surely pertinent: ‘Plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose’ (‘The more things change, the more they remain the same).’ Greenspan’s 
words remind us that hubris is not unique to the immediate past. It may now be an organic 
feature of at least some social fields within modern capitalism that are intrinsically oriented to 
short term calculation and risk, in the expectation that great rewards can be reaped.  
Bourdieu and social fields 
Bourdieu’s (1998: 40-41) notion of social fields stresses the importance of relationships, 
interaction and context. It therefore helps to open up a deeper organizational conception of 
hubris. Bourdieu defined a social field as: 
                                                     
1 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm, accessed 13th July 2018. 
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‘a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate 
and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate 
inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which various actors struggle 
for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring 
to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines the 
position in the field and, as a result, their strategies.’ 
He viewed each field as ‘an autonomous universe, a kind of arena in which people play a 
game which has certain rules, rules which are different from those of the game that is played 
in the adjacent space’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 215). The suggestion that social fields are constituted 
via ‘games’ is particularly pertinent here. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 98) stressed, 
actors invest ‘in the game, illusio (from ludus, the game): players are taken in by the game, 
they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent that they concur in their 
belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a recognition that escapes questioning. 
Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, that is “worth the candle,” and this collusion is the 
very basis of their competition.’ Put differently, various behaviours become normalised 
through processes of repetition, and the social field(s) that they create are naturalised in the 
minds of the actors concerned. I argue that banking can be viewed as a particular social field, 
where interactions, transactions and events create a power and status saturated world that 
produces, rewards and institutionalises hubristic behaviours. The ‘game’ is to acquire as much 
power, wealth and status as possible. Of course, this often puts the occupants of the given space 
in opposition to each other. As with many games, competition can be ferocious. Thus,  
‘The social space is a multi-dimensional space, an open set of fields that are relatively 
autonomous… Within each of these sub-spaces, the occupants of the dominated positions 
are constantly engaged in struggles of different forms (without necessarily constituting 
themselves into antagonistic groups’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 736).  
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This is connected to his notion of habitus, which explores how individual agency can be 
reconciled with social structure. Bourdieu (1977) stresses how habitual states, predispositions, 
tendencies and inclinations become systematically organised and acquired through, for 
example, our responsiveness to the actions of others. They therefore become durable over time, 
and are transposable since they become active in many theatres of social action (Maton, 2012). 
Thus, our membership of a social field helps constitute our habitus, and our habitus helps to 
constitute the social field.  
Such an understanding draws attention to relationships, context, situation and the dynamic 
interaction between them, and is more consistent with an organizational orientation to hubris 
(Parlett, 1991). Thus, Hilger and Mangez (2015: 3) argue that ‘the structure of the relations 
between the individual and the environment is central – the former is a function of the latter 
and vice versa. The behaviour thus depends on the configuration of the psychological field at 
a given moment.’ Hubris can be understood as the result of relationships, manifest in particular 
games and behaviours, that are displayed and strengthened by organizational contexts in which 
such behaviours and relationships are highly valued. We can view hubris as a positional game 
within organizations, an attempt to dominate the field, and a power play to accumulate social 
and, ultimately, financial capital. I return to these themes in the empirical sections of this paper. 
METHODS 
The Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was employed to gather examples of incidents, 
stories and sense-making around key experiences that were sufficiently vivid for people to 
recall and that were consistent with the criteria commonly used to define hubris. The CIT was 
initially summarized by Flanagan (1954: 327) as ‘a set of procedures for collecting direct 
observations of human behaviour in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in 
solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles.’ The CIT does not 
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require the researcher to specify a list of potential incidents or behaviours a priori (Gremler, 
2004). Rather, the researcher and the participants discover an understanding of the participants’ 
experiences together (Keatinge, 2002), by encouraging respondents to tell their story and 
enabling them to choose the incident that are most important to those who lived through them 
(Cunha, Cunha and Rego, 2009).  
As with stories in general, the literal accuracy of the events in question is less important 
than the significance that actors attribute to them (Gabriel, 2000). The CIT thus illuminates the 
issues that people see as important to their experiences of organizational life, by bringing the 
experiences and behaviours of multiple actors to the fore. In doing so, Bott and Tourish (2016: 
278) suggest that ‘the technique has inherent inductive properties, as it does not force the 
respondent into a particular framework, does not require a hypothesis, and is relatively 
culturally neutral… these characteristics are particularly useful as a means of theory 
problematization, and facilitate the discovery of multiple “surprises” in empirical material 
through the development if thick description.’ 
Interviewees 
This project was funded by the Daedalus Trust, a charitable body established to promote 
research into hubris. The Trust invited me to present at a major event on hubris in London, 
attended by approximately 150 people, which led to some participants volunteering their 
involvement. Several of these had held prominent positions in the banking and finance sectors. 
These contacts were particularly important for the identification of other senior figures who 
were willing to discuss their experiences. This sample then directed me to other participants, 
while presentations at subsequent events elsewhere attracted further expressions of interest. 
Through such snowball sampling (Goodman, 2011) an eventual total of 27 interviewees was 
obtained, encompassing three people who had held CEO positions, thirteen people with senior 
level experience, eight with middle level experience and three who were either at a junior level 
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when interviewed or who had left the sector after less than five years’ experience (see Table 
1).  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The interview schedule is contained in Appendix One. It is adapted from Owen and 
Davidson’s (2009) diagnostic criteria for identifying hubris, with a focus on the identification 
of specific behaviours associated with the criteria in question. This approach sought specific 
incidents associated with hubris rather than requiring interviews to speak of hubris in a generic 
sense, or to infer its presence by working backwards from specified organizational outcomes. 
All interviewees were assured of confidentiality. Interviews were conducted face-to-face 
where possible or preferred - for example, all three of the CEOs requested that they be 
interviewed directly. Alternatively, to suit the preferences of respondents, interviews were 
conducted by telephone or Skype. All were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. The 
transcripts were then sent to each interviewee to check for accuracy and to ensure further 
anonymization. 
Data analysis 
I used thematic analysis, viewed as a ‘method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 6). Thematic analysis looks for 
patterns of repetition. This means that sometimes themes ‘pervade much of the data, cross-
cutting many or all of the other thematic clusters’ (King, 2012: 452). Such was the case in this 
analysis. Initially, the categories identified by Owen and Davidson (2009) were regarded as 
themes and formed the basis for coding the data. This was a process of what Lee (1999: 49) 
described as ‘selective coding’ – that is, I began with categories in mind (reflecting both the 
diagnostic criteria for hubris, and the research questions animating this study) and then coded 
the data accordingly. Each transcript was read on numerous occasions to extract clear incidents. 
A post-doctoral research fellow read them independently until agreement was reached about 
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what constituted actual incidents. Where agreement could not be reached the possible incident 
was deleted from analysis. A final total of 101 incidents was identified. Common types of 
incidents recurred across the criteria proposed by Owen and Davidson (2009) to identify hubris 
– e.g. abusive behaviour, rash acquisitions, and the prioritising of personal rewards.  
The 101 incidents were coded and organised afresh in terms of themes that expressed where 
common types of incident occurred. I sought to give primacy to how interviewees understood 
their experiences. This resulted in ‘a back and forth’ iterative process between pre-existing 
categories and respondent accounts of incidents that is characteristic of qualitative research, in 
search of synergies, differences, similarities, insights and what Klag and Langley (2013) 
describe as ‘conceptual leaps’. Eventually, five key themes emerged that cut across the 
diagnostic criteria for hubris identified earlier in this paper and which guided the interview 
protocol that had been developed. 
 The analysis that follows is therefore concerned with illuminating patterns of interacting 
behaviours that interviewees associated with various categories of hubristic behaviours. 
Through focusing on behaviours and what these tell us about relationships and organizational 
contexts, the intention is to illuminate the ‘systems of dispositions (that actors) have acquired 
by internalising a determinate type of social and economic condition, and which find a definite 
trajectory within the field under construction a more or less favourable opportunity to become 
actualised’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104-5). 
 In addition, while interviewees provided incidents as asked, they also went beyond them 
to offer general observations about their industry and about hubris. Using the same approach, 
the material was repeatedly read and observations that illuminated the research questions 
guiding this project were extracted. I draw from these in the analysis that follows.  
RESULTS 
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Five themes were identified that captured the most common types of incidents that 
remained in analysis: namely, over-confidence and over-persistence; recklessness; self-
interested behaviours and isolation from reality; contempt for critical feedback, and for 
regulators; and, abusive behaviour. These are shown in Figure 1, where N is the total number 
of incidents associated each of the behaviours. The Figure suggests that each behaviour 
reinforces the other. Figure 1 also summarises the defining characteristics of hubris that guided 
the interview protocol, and suggests that the behaviours concerned feed directly into the 
creation of hubristic mind-sets and behaviours. The discussion that follows unpacks these 
relationships. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Here, I discuss the five categories of incidents, in terms of descending order of frequency.  
1. OVERCONFIDENCE AND OVER-PERSISTENCE 
Twenty-eight incidents related to this. A note of ambiguity was evident in many accounts. 
For example, a male former CEO said: 
‘(I) saw X standing on a platform talking to his troops about what they were going to do.  
It was very sophisticated. It reinforced their belief in themselves as participants in this 
transformation that was going to be wrought, and it very much reinforced their belief in 
him as their leader.  Now, from his point of view, all these were desirable. And actually to 
endow people with internal rivalries with a sense of common purpose was not an easy 
thing. It’s a performance. This is a highly theatrical business. And having people feel that 
they’re part of some great wave, it’s messianic.’ 
The idea of ‘a performance’ echoes Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of a social field as ‘a game.’ 
In common with any game, or performance, the actor does not have to mean it, at least initially. 
But their mastery of the game may have two effects. Firstly, like a method actor over immersed 
in a part, they can come to internalise the essence of their performance, so that a) the regular 
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performance of optimism becomes wedded to who they are, and who they are perceived to be, 
and b) they ‘self-persuade’ themselves of the optimistic messages they are communicating. 
The game owns the player rather than the player owning the game. Secondly, they role model 
a spirit of over-optimism for others, who have a need for the reassurance that this offers, and 
who then become inclined to emulate the optimistic behaviours and attitudes of the performer 
in question. Increasingly, the social field becomes dominated by a habitus characterised by 
public demonstrations of (excessive) optimism. In the process, hubris is co-constructed through 
the dynamic interactions of actors who expect certain performances from each other, and then 
reinforce such performances in numerous ways (e.g., through conformity enacted in group 
rituals that discourage questioning and dissent, and via the exchange of material rewards).  
The interviewee acknowledges that a great deal of confidence is required to do the job (or 
play the game) of rallying people behind a common sense of purpose, and, in that respect, it is 
an organizational imperative that is seen as positive. It remains difficult to determine when it 
becomes harmful. Likewise, a male Senior Manager described a prominent banker as follows: 
‘… incredibly charming. Who hates the bankers the most? I would place a bet that that 
person within ten minutes they would be charmed by X. Always, even you could have 
flooding going on in here and he’d say, this restaurant is brilliant.  It’s going to be great, 
we’ll have this sorted in two minutes.  This is going to take off.  I, me, it’s all about them.  
There’s no sense of we, or we are accomplishing.  It’s I this, I’m going to do this.  I’m 
incredibly positive, I’m incredibly optimistic about the future.  I, I, I.’   
Such charm is hard to resist, but is also useful to those seeking to build positions of power 
within organizations (Keltner, 2016). However, the interviewee is describing here a level of 
super-confidence in all situations. This suggests that confidence might be viewed as over-
confidence when it becomes an indiscriminate reflex that is relatively indifferent to the actual 
circumstances being faced. It may be that banking and finance represent an organizational 
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context that is particularly conducive to the emergence of such behaviours. For example, 
Storey (2011) explores how business owners looking for financial support are habitually 
overoptimistic about their prospects of success, and play down the influence of chance on 
business outcomes. This may constitute another organizational dynamic tempting bankers into 
over-optimism: in a further instance of co-construction, a key part of their client base displays 
it for them, and welcomes it in return. 
While all leaders may exhibit dangerous levels of over-confidence at times, many correct 
themselves by observing the impact they have on others, and by checking their strategies and 
expectations against what is happening in the outside world. Without such reflexivity, 
fantastically unreal visions, strategies and expectations can be developed. A female middle 
manager recounts one such incident as follows: 
‘The CEO rang me up… and asked me to create a market for this toxic rubbish that was 
being devalued every day…And she thought, because we were a market operator, we could 
trade the stuff. So the reality was we couldn’t, because each stock was unique…. Now, for 
me, the element of hubris here was the arrogance of which she was actually, for good 
reasons, good intentions, thought that she could provide a market solution to a situation 
that was broken.’ 
A male senior manager who worked as a regulator showed how exaggerated confidence 
led to boasting about possibly illegal activities, and therefore risked prosecution: 
 ‘He thought he was above the law. There’s another chairman of another bank who I have 
evidence of doing almost exactly the same. I don’t have enough evidence to prosecute him, 
he doesn’t know, but I know. So I’ll be looking at him. And these are senior people. So it 
tends to be the senior people. The people… the kind of more organised crime people that I 
deal with, you know, they have throw-away mobile phones, they’re not thinking they’re 
above the law. They know what the law is, and they’re trying to avoid it.’ 
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These problems were reinforced by the out-sourcing of risk assessment to rating agencies 
who then sold ‘fantasy’ back to the sector by under-stating credit risks (Wolf, 2014). A male 
senior manager highlighted the effects on key people within the industry:  
‘The argument increasingly became “hang on guys, let the rating agencies (assess credit 
risk).... They’re experts.” They pushed that concept rigorously to banks and institutions 
and they won. Everybody accepted that they were the authorities on credit rating. Now, 
they’re fucked because they’re discredited through the collapse of the mortgage backed 
securities market.’  
Misplaced faith in ratings agencies bred confidence in decisions that were ultimately shown 
to be flawed. Risk assessment became little more than an empty game that organizational actors 
used to comfort themselves and reassure others. The result was greater recklessness.  
2. RECKLESSNESS 
Twenty-seven incidents fitted this category. Accounts of over-hyped acquisitions were 
common. A male senior manager recalled a particular acquisition as follows: 
‘(We) spent about I think 775 million dollars… on buying a small retail bank in Russia.  
The then chief executive of the global retail and consumer banking side… was determined 
to, in his phrase, ‘plant flags in new territories.’ So one of the things you’ll find with some 
chief execs is glory through acquisition… He ignored everybody and bought it. We bought 
an absolute dog of a bank.  It was I mean, literally the Russian mafia owned it.  Saw us 
coming, and X have since sold it back… last year.  So five years later for about £25 
million.’ 
 Interestingly, many other interviewees reported that similar warnings were expressed but 
ignored. This calls to mind the wider organizational phenomenon of silence, in which actors 
either minimise their expression of concern and dissent, or face such discouragement when 
they do so that they gradually self-censor their views (Tourish and Robson, 2006). The lack of 
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critical feedback, when combined with people having a vested financial interest in successful 
outcomes, ensured that many became over-committed to whatever strategy they were pursuing. 
A male former CEO recalled: 
‘I remember a particular deal where the chief executive (was) coming under pressure from 
the chairman to complete this deal. And it was at a moment when one could have walked 
away from the deal. But I remember the chief executive thinking that if he did not go 
forward with the deal, it could be a career-limiting decision, and in the event, we went 
ahead with the deal. Q: And was it a good deal or a bad deal? A: Bad. Very bad.’ 
Pressure was also applied from those whose fees depended on the completion of 
acquisitions. A social field was being constructed that embraced more actors and blurred 
boundaries between what may once have been less porous organizational configurations.  One 
senior male interviewee said:  
‘In the old days, corporate financiers who gave you advice lived by giving you a bill for 
that advice. It was, in relative terms, modest. If you then say, “well actually not only am I 
giving you this advice, but we will issue the securities, distribute the securities, do the loan 
financing, underwrite the deal, etcetera,” that hundred has now become a thousand. So the 
scale of these transactions (has) meant that they simply cannot give you dispassionate 
advice.’  
In the process, borderline or outright illegality may occur. The male senior manager who 
was a regulator spoke of an incident as follows: 
‘We fined a guy, of X investment bank for disclosing what we call inside information. In 
a nutshell, he’d written such-and-such company has just discovered oil, and it wasn’t 
disclosed to the market place. And we found it, and it was improper disclosure, and he was 
fined £X… He is the chairman of one of the most venerable investment banks in the 
country, and he was doing it to show off.’ 
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While Boards are supposed to exercise a check on reckless behaviours, several 
interviewees doubted their ability to do so. Their comments reinforce the findings of 
Oehmichen, Braun, Wolff, and Yoshikawa (2017: 1050). They conclude that the benefits from 
having prestigious individuals on Boards (e.g. access to social capital) can be undermined by 
forms of ‘elite cohesion and… elite exclusiveness’ that may generate nepotism between 
directors and managers. For example, a senior male manager argued that:  
‘People want to become a non-executive director, because you can get four or five of them 
for ten to 15 days of work a year.  Your job is to ask awkward questions.  So the executives 
would come in, present their strategy, or plans. But you learn as a non-executive director, 
you don’t want to challenge too hard, because if you challenge too hard, the chairman 
brought you in for a little chat, and I saw this happen a number of times, so that’s not how 
you do business here. The word would go round the chairmen of different institutions that 
you were trouble.’  
This ‘cosiness’ is likely to prevent vigilant monitoring. Moreover, the absence of critical 
feedback reinforces excessive self-confidence in a never ending and mutually reinforcing loop 
of delusional beliefs leading to reckless behaviour, and reckless behaviour further 
strengthening delusional beliefs.  
3. SELF-INTERESTED BEHAVIOURS AND INSULATION FROM REALITY  
I identified 21 incidents that fit this category. These highlighted a culture of extreme 
privilege which the interviewees felt prevented those affected from forming a realistic 
understanding of their own organizations, and the world beyond them. A male senior manager 
spoke of a Board Chairman as follows: 
‘The chairman of X… was Lord Y. …  And you’d go occasionally to lunch with (him) and 
you’d walk up to the reception desk, they obviously didn’t know who you were, and the 
moment you said I’ve got lunch with Lord Y, they ushered you into a roped-off lift that 
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went straight up to the Nth floor where you were met by a sort of liveried butler, ushered 
into Lord Y’s private lunchroom… And at the end of lunch once ... he offered me the car 
to go back to the office, the car being a chauffeur-driven Roller. You know, what happens 
to these tycoons is they surround themselves, not deliberately, with yes men, but that’s how 
they become.’  
A male senior manager gave an account of behaviour which borders on eccentricity, but of 
a particularly self-inflated kind: 
‘(The CEO) had a Starbucks built inside (the) office because he only liked Starbucks 
coffee.  He didn’t like having to go out for it, or send one of his runners to go out and get 
coffee so he had one, a small thing set up in the corner of his floor which was Starbucks, 
just for him. They would bring his coffee to him in a cup.  It had to be done in a certain 
way and if the cup was laid down, it had to be, the Starbucks logo had to be pointed towards 
him.’ 
A female middle manager offered a further striking example: 
 ‘The chief executive wouldn’t engage with her staff, but that wasn’t a new behaviour; that 
was her behaviour from the day she joined. So she had a key to the lifts, and she would key 
the lifts off so that staff couldn’t travel in the same lift as she did. And there was one 
example when she forgot to key the lift off, and it opened at a floor and one of my 
colleagues got in, and she asked the person to leave the lift.’ 
She then went on to provide this example: 
‘And I used to have a good working relationship with her (the CEO). I happened to be in 
the same queue as she was buying groceries at Marks and Spencer’s, and I had the audacity 
to turn round to her and say good morning, and I was reprimanded for… Not by her, but 
by my director, for having spoken to her in a queue in the shop.’ 
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Bourdieu (1991: 106) highlighted how ‘The structure of social space manifests itself, in 
the most diverse contexts, in the form of spatial oppositions, appropriated physical space 
functioning as a spontaneous metaphor for the social order… The stake of these struggles is 
the construction of spatially based homogeneous groupings, that is, segregation that is both 
cause and effect of the exclusive usage of a space.’ The incidents I describe here showcase 
precisely these processes. They suggest that architecture and buildings (including private 
dining rooms, specially tailored offices and adapted lifts) were a means for powerful 
individuals to acquire social capital. This contributes to a social field conducive to hubris in at 
least two senses. Firstly, elite actors become more divorced from reality, as they enter a world 
where their ever more eccentric whims are indulged by compliant subordinates and peers. A 
habitus of entitlement and an awareness of occupying an environment that is very different to 
the ‘outside’ world looms large. Secondly, it seems likely that other actors will aspire to similar 
levels of affluence and influence, and emulate the behaviours of those that have already 
succeeded in achieving them. Thus, the social field of what I characterise as hubristic banking 
exists in the immediately observable behaviours and relationships of various actors. But it is 
also a process of becoming, as others comply with the demands of hubristic mind-sets, seek to 
emulate them, and are rewarded for doing so by a gradual progression to leadership positions. 
At some level, there can be an awareness of how damaging much of this is. One of my 
interviewees, himself a senior manager, spoke of a top banker as follows: ‘Someone asked 
once how his wife would describe him, and he just turned around in all seriousness and said, 
‘lost’.’ None of this seems likely to produce a balanced view of oneself, of one’s place within 
the wider world, or of what might be appropriate relationships with other powerful actors and 
agencies. 
In terms of social fields and organizational processes, an additional dynamic is also evident 
in these accounts. Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003: 465) have noted that much field theory 
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research ‘explicitly focalizes overt forms of power by analysing the origins of logics and other 
cultural meaning systems that constitute actors and ‘valorise’ certain dimensions of inequality 
over others.’ However, valorisation is a complex concept. On the surface, the stories of 
hubristic leaders that I provide here are a form of mockery, perhaps intended to bring hubristic 
leaders down to size, upset power relations and distance the story teller from the object of 
ridicule. But these dysfunctional power relations are also being affirmed rather than negated, 
in at least two ways. Firstly, to coin a phrase, the interviewees live in ‘the real world’ rather 
than an imaginary idyll of workplace perfection. Despite criticisms of the present, there was 
little suggestion that another reality could be brought into existence by human action. 
Secondly, as Gabriel (1997: 316) has observed: ‘To many people in the lower echelons of 
organizations, top leaders do not appear altogether human, not at least in the sense that 
colleagues or immediate superiors are.’  But narratives focusing on leaders who have Supreme 
Power also implicitly minimise the possibility of resistance, for who can be expected to resist 
such all-powerful beings? They thus reinforce imbalanced power relationships even as they 
purport to subvert them. The dominant social field of hubristic banking is thereby strengthened. 
4. CONTEMPT FOR CRITICAL FEEDBACK 
In total, 17 incidents reflected this. These data are consistent with issues of over-confidence 
and recklessness (see above). They reinforce a view of hubris as being produced by the 
interaction of multiple behaviours and contextual influences. Many interviewees spoke of 
warning signs ignored in the rush to pursue particularly harmful courses of action, driven by 
people’s excessive faith in the quality of their judgement. This example from a male senior 
manager is typical of many: 
‘A major financial services takeover was going down. A friend of mine… was in a meeting 
with the acquisition team, was running the takeover, and he sort of felt, you know, what’s 
going on here? And the guy said… we just don’t think this deal should be done. We think 
 23 
it’s getting too expensive, it’s getting too complex, the market’s changing, we shouldn’t be 
doing this deal. So this chum of mine said, well, have you told the chief executive or the 
chairman? No. So he told them, I’m having breakfast with him tomorrow morning. Shall I 
say there’s concerns in the team about this? Anyway, so (they) are having breakfast, talking 
through what they need to go through. And (he said) there’s a lot of concern about this deal 
in the team. So there was a bit of a pause, chief executive: clear your desk, get out, you’re 
fired…. And if you open your mouth about this I will sue you to hell and back.’ 
As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 96) express it, ‘To think in terms of fields is to think 
relationally.’ Thus, there are plentiful claims in the leadership literature that effective leaders 
set a powerful example that others then emulate (e.g. Goodwin, 2018). But the notion of 
mirroring can also be applied to ineffective leaders and destructive leadership behaviours, not 
least because their ineffectiveness and destructiveness may not be as evident at the time as they 
appear in retrospect. An organizational perspective on hubris explores how hubristic leaders 
set a particular kind of example that is also imitated and institutionalised. Thus, I suggest that 
the above incident is one of many where leaders role model hubristic behaviours. Actors cannot 
fail to notice that compliance offers a route to advancement. Increasingly, they copy the 
hubristic behaviours of those at the top. Yet without critical feedback the social field becomes 
dominated by a monocultural habitus that is supportive of the ever greater exercise of power, 
since overt challenges to convention and power are discouraged. As Sadler-Smith (2019: 7) 
argues: ‘…hubristic leadership is more likely to emerge when there is a co-existence of a 
hubristic leader with collusive followers in a conducive context.’ Hubristic leaders do not stand 
apart from complex processes, exerting various forms of influence on actors while remaining 
themselves relatively immune to the influencing actions of others. Rather, they are themselves 
part of, and are relationally constituted by, complex adaptive systems (Tourish, 2018). A 
hubristic social field is co-constructed through the interactions of multiple actors, each with 
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different forms of relational power at their disposal. Thus, the collusion of followers fuels ever 
greater levels of confidence on the part of leaders. In turn, it can lead to grotesque displays of 
arrogance. A male CEO offered an example of precisely such arrogance towards someone with 
an international reputation: 
‘I went to a dinner once in Berlin with Gerhard Schröder when he’d recently become 
Chancellor. Even if you didn’t like him, he was the Chancellor of a major country. And he 
had this group of bankers for dinner from London. And under the leadership of one of them 
they spent the evening insulting him effectively. “Why did you do something so dumb?”  
“What was going through your head?”  “Why did it seem smart to take this action?”  “Do 
you realise what the markets think of you?”… I mean, they had completely forgotten who 
they were talking to.  It was grotesque.’ 
The acquisition and cultivation of power is here clearly indicated as a facilitator of hubris: 
the powerful individuals highlighted in these incidents combined an exaggerated sense of self 
with a diminished sense of the value of others. In essence, as a group or mini-organization, 
they appear to have developed a collective form of hubris.  
Accounts of a contemptuous attitude to regulatory authorities are particularly alarming. 
The following illustration comes from a male senior manager: 
‘We had to do a presentation to what was then the FSA. So we went to this meeting and… 
these two, what looked like children walked in. I found out both were one year out of 
College. Shaking, they were so nervous about coming into a big office like ours, the chief 
executive, the whole works and I was sitting there thinking, this is ridiculous.  They just 
said, ‘I have a couple of questions for clarification on the material that we had sent. Thank 
you ever so much.  We’ll see you again in a year.’ It was known through the 2000s, if you 
couldn’t get a job in a bank you’d get a job at the FSA.’  
 ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR  
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Eight incidents fell into this category. A male senior manager offered a particularly 
interesting example, since it includes an implication at the very least of physical violence: 
‘I was privy to X literally threatening another executive with a baseball bat. Y was the 
group head of marketing and brand, and therefore wanted to spend some of the group 
budget on brand and marketing, on stuff that would impact the brand across the whole 
group, including X’s world of capital. Y had his evidence, both in terms of brand strategy, 
the positive analysis that said what X was planning to do in marketing and brand was not 
optimum. In his youth, he was a boxer. X was his usual charming, wonderful self. I’m sure 
we can sort this out.  It’s going to be fine, let me explain what I want to do.  Y came back 
with his counter-arguments and I could see X was getting angry and then (he) used the 
lines of…  you don’t understand.  We’re going to do it my way. Y said no, and in the end, 
X started to yell at him.  Y would yell and scream literally, and then the yells and screams 
turned into personal insults, F word, C word, the whole lot.  Now that’s not uncommon for 
those guys. You effing little C, you effing do that now, I’m going to come by yours and 
kick your effing head in. So he was yelling and screaming and Y, quite rightly, was just 
sitting there calmly, he said,… calm down. X had two baseball bats in his office and he 
just got up and picked up a baseball bat. Just said to Y, if you don’t do what I’m telling 
you to do, you’re going to regret it. Y just very calmly went, if you lay one finger on me, 
I’m going to put you in hospital. X just put it down and, hey, you know I’m only joking. 
Of course Y just left the meeting and said, you’re an idiot.  Went straight to the then chief 
executive’s office with me in tow.  Explained what had happened to the then chief exec 
and I guess in my mind, I thought X’s on his way.’  
Instead of being ‘on his way’, the person responsible for the behaviour in question became 
the Bank’s CEO, and achieved an international profile. It illustrates how ‘the structure of the 
organizational field is constituted by the actual power relations among actors, which are 
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characterised by an ongoing power struggle for attaining a dominant position in the field’ (van 
Aaken, Splitter, and Seidl,  2013: 368). This suggests that hubris is nurtured over an extended 
period within banking. Rather than suddenly afflict people who acquire leadership roles (as 
some research appears to suggest), a tolerance of misdeeds (as in the example above) reinforces 
hubristic behaviours at various stages of an actor’s career. If it can be said that a social field of 
hubristic banking has become well established, it may even be that people acquire leadership 
positions precisely because of hubristic inclinations rather than in spite of them, since it is 
assumed they will proceed to deliver positive financial results.  
DISCUSSION  
The data discussed above points to a dynamic view of hubris, in which behaviours interact 
with each other within a given organizational context to produce a social field that I have 
characterised as hubristic banking. This suggest that hubris emerges through a number of what 
I term ‘inflection dynamics’ – that is, organizational forces that impact on individuals such that 
they decisively reinforce the behaviours and attitudes that Figure 1 suggests indicate the 
presence of hubris. I suggest that five such dynamics can be identified in those data above, 
namely: (1) A systematic pressure for success (2) High levels of reward (3) The acquisition of 
power (4) Perks of office (5) The failure to punish transgressions, and instead often reward 
them.  
I view these as a series of interlocking and mutually reinforcing dynamics rather than stand-
alone phenomena. In Bourdieu’s terms, they create a social field that is especially conducive 
to hubris. Thus, systemic pressure for success was a frequent theme in my interviews. The 
culture described was one of incessant pressure to achieve results that required hard work and 
a total immersion of people in the norms of banking and finance. Many responded positively 
to this imperative. In the process, they convinced themselves of the spectacular value of the 
work that they did, and of their own extraordinary importance in doing it. Some even went so 
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far as belittle an elected head of state. High levels of reward for those who succeeded further 
inflamed a growing sense of confidence, a determination to do more to obtain ever greater 
rewards, and a feeling that these were merited. This, of course, necessitated the gradual 
acquisition of power. The downsides of this that I have documented in the analysis above is 
consistent with much other research on power and the dark side of leadership more widely (e.g. 
Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Tourish, 2013). It bred a sense of entitlement and difference that seems 
innately conducive to hubris, as in the example of a CEO using her own elevator key to avoid 
interaction with others. Other perks of office (e.g. the ability to construct one’s own Starbucks 
coffee area in a private office) signalled a growing detachment from the work norms exhibited 
by other people. But, given the pressure for success, those seen as delivering could find their 
transgressions unpunished/ rewarded. I offered the particularly striking example of a senior 
manager who appeared to threaten physical violence, but went on to become his bank’s CEO, 
until a variety of well-publicised events brought his career to an unhappy conclusion. In this 
instance, at least, nemesis did indeed flow from hubris. Nevertheless, these incidents speak to 
out of control individuals with a strong sense of self-importance, and the status to have their 
behaviours tolerated. They are consistent with a toxic organizational culture. When such 
behaviours are rewarded, fully fledged hubris is likely.  
This is supported by Scott’s (1995: 56) view of ‘organizational fields,’ which he defined 
as ‘a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose 
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside 
the field.’ Organizations and the social fields they inhabit develop partly because behaviours, 
attitudes, and cultural norms are drawn from options that acquire legitimacy through modelling 
by influential actors within the organization and within the wider sector that it inhabits 
(Hoffman, 1999). Organizational boundaries in banking and finance are porous as actors 
switch their allegiance from one brand to another. This lends itself to organizational 
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isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983): actors carry learned attitudes and behaviours with 
them when they change jobs or roles. They then go on to select, reward and promote those who 
draw from well-established behavioural and attitudinal norms, while at the same time not 
selecting, punishing, stalling and terminating the careers of those who do not. 
An organizational perspective resists pathologizing individuals, a favourite media pastime, 
and suggests the need for action at individual, organizational and social levels if the problem 
of hubris is to be reduced. This poses a further challenge to the usefulness of the DSV 
diagnostic criteria discussed earlier in this paper. They may offer a useful starting point for the 
further study of hubristic behaviours. But the finding that certain behaviours crisscross the 
DSV categories suggests that the categories have less explanatory value than purely 
psychological perspectives tend to assume. A more embedded and organizational perspective 
is required.  
This invites a greater appreciation of how multiple factors interact with each other over 
extended time periods to produce complex hubristic outcomes. Hubris is best conceived as a 
series of interacting behaviours. These are precipitated by organizational dynamics that 
intensify imbalanced power relationships, leading people to prioritize self-interest and 
diminish the importance of robust debate and dissent. Hubris is thus rooted in a gradual 
acclimatization to toxic organizational cultures, the obtaining of high rewards for success, a 
consequent sense of entitlement, and an untethering of people’s egos from any measure of 
sustainable achievement. As many studies of the banking and finance sectors have shown, and 
as the data in this paper illustrates, the performative norms that prevail within this sector seems 
to perfectly facilitate the development of hubris. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
Many commentators have observed that the behaviours which led to the 2008 crash remain 
substantially in place (e.g. Luyendijk, 2015). A major report on the culture of retail banking 
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concluded that ‘cultural changes in major banks remains fragile… Our over-arching conclusion 
us that it will take a generation to create a new culture in UK retail banks’ (Spicer, Gond, Patel, 
Lindley, Fleming, Mosonyi, Benoit, and Parker, 2014: 9-10). If little has changed, it may be 
that further crises are inevitable, perhaps even on a greater scale than that of 2008. This surely 
poses an urgent question: what, if anything, can be done, and done rapidly, to ease the effects 
of hubris? Specifically, I suggest that: 
1. The data suggests that a derogatory attitude to regulators was a key ingredient of the 
hubristic behaviours that led to malpractice. Some novice regulators themselves felt 
intimidated by those they were supposed to regulate. This lack of confidence and 
expertise seems to have hindered rigorous investigation. Thus, Green (2015) criticized 
the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority’s predecessor institution, the Financial 
Standards Authority, for failing to investigate malpractice when the statutory threshold 
test for such investigations had been met. At a minimum, regulators must have the 
resources, expertise and experienced personnel to be credible deterrents of malpractice. 
This draws attention to the quality of regulation, rather than the  often tired debate about 
whether we need more or less of it. 
2. A recurring theme in these data is that Boards failed to exercise restraint on over-
ambitious CEOs and their plans. One factor was that members were anxious not to 
offend powerful CEOs. In contrast, Haldane’s (2014) analysis of decision making at 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is explicit in recognizing the 
positive role of dissent, and highlights how often members opposed a majority view. 
The data also suggests that the culture of the banking and finance sectors often 
pressurizes even senior people to conform to the demands of powerful CEOs, in the 
interests of retaining their places on various Boards. Yet groups, particularly Boards, 
require exposure to multiple different opinions if they are to avert hubris. Key decision 
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makers need more awareness of the techniques for ensuring that this occurs. Board 
members may well benefit from more training. In addition, systemic reforms could seek 
to prevent the emergence of cartels of individuals who have too many over-lapping 
relationships to effectively discharge their fiduciary responsibilities. 
3. The data repeatedly showed a cavalier attitude to risk management, driven by the 
expectation of high rewards when the risks pay off. Hubris is endemic to such 
calculations. The Turner Report (2009) urged incentive schemes to avoid rewarding 
undue risk taking and to integrate risk management decisions into the remuneration 
process. Despite this advice, a more balanced approach to this has proven elusive. In 
the longer run, it is vital.  
4. Performance management systems need to change in multiple ways. My data highlights 
toxic behaviours as a manifestation of hubris, and suggests that they are often not dealt 
with through appropriate disciplinary procedures. As in other spheres of working life, 
a zero tolerance approach to threats of violence and abusive language, the clear 
articulation of acceptable standards of behaviour, and robust action against offenders 
seems appropriate.  
CONCLUSION 
More open-ended forms of inquiry into hubris than can be found in conventional 
approaches to researching this issue are called for. It is important to avoid using the terms 
‘over-confidence’ and ‘recklessness’ as inaccurate and simplistic post-hoc rationalizations for 
organizational failure. In line with Bourdieu’s theory of social fields, we also need to pay more 
attention to how behaviours, dispositions and organizational contexts interact and are 
facilitated by inflection dynamics to produce hubris.  
When banks fail they cause damage far beyond themselves. While this could be said of all 
organizational failures, the finance sector is particularly well placed to inflict systemic harm 
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on our society. In adding to our understanding of hubris and what we can do to reduce its 
effects, this paper seeks to improve our ability to avoid potentially catastrophic financial 
shocks in the future.  
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APPENDIX ONE – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE2 
Introductory statement 
Firstly, would you please give your name and some background about your experience of the 
banking sector. 
As you know, this project is concerned with hubris among people working in the banking 
sector. I am particularly interested in identifying significant situations, or critical incidents, in 
which hubris can be said to have developed. By hubris, I mean behaviour that goes far 
beyond confidence or even over confidence. I want to identify a number of things that define 
hubris and ask you to recall, if possible, a significant or critical situation that you remember 
above all others where you saw this behaviour in action: 
Q1. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone was more 
keen on exercising power and seeking glory for themselves than solving problems primarily 
for the benefit of the organization: 
Prompts include: 
What happened next? 
Who was involved? 
What did other people do? 
What was the outcome? 
How did that outcome make you feel? 
How would you describe your behavior in handling this situation? 
How would you describe other people’s behavior in handling this situation? 
What could have been done to make your response and that of other people more effective? 
 
                                                     
2 Note that the same prompts were used for all questions, and have been included here only for question one for 
reasons of space 
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Q2. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone took action 
that seemed likely to cast them in a good light mainly or only in order to enhance their image: 
Q3. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone showed a 
messianic manner of taking about what they were doing: 
Q4. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone talked about 
themselves in the third person or using the royal ‘we’: 
Q5. Please describe a significant situation where someone showed excessive confidence in 
their own judgment and contempt for the advice or criticism of others: 
Q6. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone showed 
exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally could 
achieve: 
Q7. Please describe a significant situation where someone showed a belief that rather than be 
accountable to colleagues, laws or regulators they were either not answerable to anyone at all, 
or answerable instead to market forces (or some other more generalized authority): 
Q8. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone showed a 
particularly high degree of restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness: 
Q9. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone showed a loss 
of contact with reality, and perhaps became more isolated from other people: 
Q10. Please describe a significant situation where it could be said that someone became 
committed to certain behaviours, and became increasingly unwilling to consider its 
practicality, costs or unwanted outcomes: 





Table 1: Interviewee Profile 
 
Position Male Female Total 
CEO 3 0 3 
Senior 11 2 13 
Middle 4 4 8 
Junior 2 1 3 




Chief Executive Officer (CEO) = Bank; Insurance company; International wealth management 
group 
 
Senior = Board membership/ Director of key function (e.g. Director of HR; Chief Financial 
Officer; Head of Strategy; Senior Vice-President with global role); 10 plus-years experience, 
including in key roles (e.g. senior role in Financial Services Authority)  
 
Middle = More than five-years experience in middle range roles (e.g. managing back and front 
office functions; leadership coach, working up to director level; consulting on cost 
optimisation) 
 

































N = 21 Behaviour 4: 
Contempt for critical 
feedback 
 




N = 8 
HUBRIS 
1. Seeking power and glory for 
self 
2. Taking action mainly to show 
self in good light 
3. A messianic manner of speech 
4. Talk of self in third person 
5. Excessive confidence 
6. Sense of omnipotence 
7. Not feeling accountable 
8. Recklessness, restlessness, 
impulsiveness 
9. Loss of contact with reality 
10. Over-commitment to 
behaviours/ unwilling to 
consider unwanted outcomes 
